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strength to effectively defend its state sovereignty 
and wield significant global influence, it is 
still preoccupied by its immediate interests 
concerning daunting internal and external 
challenges to its regime survival, economic 
development and territorial integrity. Beijing’s 
assertiveness in defending its core interests, 
therefore, is not accompanied by a broad vision 
as a rising global power, making China often 
reluctant to shoulder greater international 
responsibilities. In its search for its rightful place, 
China is still reluctant to meet expectations for 
it to play the leadership role of a great power.
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Introduction
China’s phenomenal rise as a great 
power has been accompanied by a change 
in its foreign policy behaviour, adopting 
a more confrontational position in 
relation to Western countries, as well 
Abstract
This article seeks answers to two related 
questions in the context of China’s rise as a great 
power. Has the Chinese leadership abandoned 
Deng’s low-profile diplomacy and reoriented 
Chinese foreign policy towards a more assertive 
or even aggressive direction, supported by its 
new quotient of wealth and power? Is China 
ready to take a global leadership role and 
assume international responsibility as a great 
power? Focusing on China’s foreign policy after 
the beginning of the global downturn in 2008, 
this article finds that China has indeed become 
increasingly assertive in its defence of so-called 
‘core’ national interests, reacting stridently to all 
perceived slights against its national pride and 
sovereignty. While China has built its national 
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Seeking an answer to these questions, 
this article focuses on China’s foreign 
policy behaviour after the beginning 
of the global downturn in 2008. It 
finds that China has indeed become 
increasingly assertive in its defence of the 
so-called ‘core’ national interests, reacting 
stridently to all perceived slights against 
its national pride and sovereignty. These 
changes produced deleterious effects on 
China’s foreign policy making, and led 
China into tension with both Western 
powers and its Asian neighbours, making 
China ‘one of the loneliest rising powers 
in world history’.4 Despite the significant 
change, most of China’s foreign policy 
decisions were made through the lenses 
of issues that were of sole importance 
to China, rather than on the basis of 
broader regional or global economic 
and security concerns. While China 
has built its national strength to defend 
effectively its state sovereignty and wield 
significant global influence, it is still 
preoccupied with its immediate interests 
concerning daunting internal and 
as tougher actions, including repeated 
use of paramilitary forces, economic 
sanctions, fishing and oil ventures, and 
other intimidating means, to deal with 
territorial disputes in the South and 
East China Seas in the late 2000s and 
the early 2010s. This development has 
raised at least two related questions. 
One is whether the Chinese leadership 
has abandoned Deng’s low-profile 
diplomacy and has reoriented Chinese 
foreign policy towards a more assertive 
or even aggressive direction, supported 
by its new quotient of wealth and 
power, as an increasing number of 
observers have suggested that China has 
emerged ‘sooner and more assertively 
than was expected before the wrenching 
global financial crisis’.1 A Western 
scholar even went so far as to argue 
that ‘Beijing now asserts its interests- 
and its willingness to prevail- even at 
the expense of appearing the villain’.2 
Another Western observer believed that 
China was ‘moving gingerly beyond the 
paradigm of developmental modesty’.3 
The second question is whether China 
is ready to take a global leadership role 
and international responsibility as a great 
power in confronting problems such as 
climate change, genocide, and nuclear 
proliferation. In other words, is China 
prepared to play the positive leadership 
role of a great power in the 21st century?
Most of China’s foreign policy 
decisions were made through 
the lenses of issues that were of 
sole importance to China, rather 
than on the basis of broader 
regional or global economic and 
security concerns.
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other Western powers.5 China’s low-
profile policy was a response to China’s 
vulnerability in the wake of the Western 
sanctions following the Tiananmen 
Square protests in 1989. As a result, 
Beijing devised a ‘mulin zhengce’ [good 
neighbour policy] for relations with its 
Asian neighbors to create a peaceful 
regional environment conducive to its 
economic development. In its relations 
with major powers, Beijing made 
pragmatic accommodations to ‘learn 
to live with the hegemon’, i.e., make 
adaptations and policy adjustments 
to accord with the reality of U.S. 
dominance in the international system, 
and because the U.S. held the key to 
China’s continuing modernisation 
efforts.6 
After rapid economic growth over the 
past three decades, China weathered the 
global economic slowdown that started 
in 2008 better than many Western 
countries, and overtook Japan as the 
world’s second-largest economy in 2010. 
China’s foreign policy behaviour has, 
external challenges to its regime survival, 
economic development and territorial 
integrity. Beijing’s assertiveness in 
defending its core interests, therefore, 
is not accompanied by a broad vision 
as a rising global power, making China 
often reluctant to shoulder greater 
international responsibilities. Still in 
search of its rightful place in the 21st 
century world, China is still reluctant 
to meet expectations for it to play the 
leadership role of a great power. This 
article starts with an analysis of China’s 
pursuit of its core interests during the 
global downturn and then goes on to 
explain its driving forces. The third 
section examines the implications of 
China’s new assertiveness in pursuance 
of its core interests.
From taoguangyanghui to 
Assertively Pursuing Core 
Interests
For many years after the end of 
the Cold War, being aware that its 
circumscribed national strength and 
geostrategic position did not allow it 
to exert enough clout, China followed 
the taoguangyanghui policy- hiding 
its capabilities, focusing on national 
strength-building, and biding its time- 
set by Deng Xiaoping in the early 
1990s, kept its head low and avoided 
confrontation with the U.S. and 
China followed the 
taoguangyanghui policy- hiding 
its capabilities, focusing on 
national strength-building, and 
biding its time- set by Deng 
Xiaoping in the early 1990s,
Suisheng Zhao
104
In its relationship with Western 
countries, China no longer avoided 
appearing confrontational, ‘berating 
American officials for the global economic 
crisis, stage-managing President Obama’s 
visit to China in November, refusing 
to back a tougher climate change 
agreement in Copenhagen, and standing 
fast against American demands for 
tough new Security Council sanctions 
against Iran’.8 With Western economies 
floundering and Chinese economic and 
diplomatic clout rising, a perception of 
the U.S. in heavy debt to China, but still 
attempting to leverage its superiority to 
keep China down, has made Chinese 
leaders less willing to make adaptations 
and more ready to challenge the U.S. in 
defending what they call core interests. 
A battered West presented a gratifying 
target for pent-up contempt. 
Raising the stakes with regard to the 
U.S. predictable arms sales to Taiwan, 
China ratcheted up the rhetoric in 
its dire-sounding warnings against 
the consequences of the arms sales 
as a serious challenge to China’s core 
interests. Rear Admiral Yang Yi openly 
stated that it was time for China to 
sanction the U.S. defense firms behind 
the sales to “reshape the policy choices 
of the U.S.”.9 When the Obama 
Administration notified Congress of the 
US $6.4 billion arms sale to Taiwan on 
29 January, his administration was met 
therefore, shifted towards a more assertive 
direction. For one thing, China’s core 
national interests, defined as ‘the bottom-
line of national survival’ and essentially 
non-negotiable,7 suddenly became a 
fashionable term, appearing increasingly 
frequently in speeches of Chinese leaders 
and official publications. While some 
Chinese scholars have cautioned to be 
more ambiguous in listing China’s core 
interests, to leave room for maneuver, 
Chinese leaders have made it clear that 
sovereignty and territorial integrity are 
among China’s core national interests. 
Chosen obviously with the intent to 
signal the resolve of China’s rising power 
aspirations, Chinese leaders have steadily 
included more and more controversial 
issues in the expanding list of China’s core 
interests. Pursuing these core interests, 
China has reoriented its foreign policy 
in a more assertive direction, reacting 
stridently to all perceived slights against 
its national pride and sovereignty. These 
changes damaged China’s relations with 
Western countries and many of its Asian-
Pacific neighbours.
Fueled by rapid economic 
growth, China engaged for 
nearly two decades in a swift 
and wide-ranging military 
modernisation with an emphasis 
on building naval capacity.
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capacity as the president of the European 
Union (EU), Beijing abruptly canceled 
the scheduled EU summit in December 
2008 to show that, even amid the global 
economic crisis, it was ready to confront 
the leaders of its biggest trading partners. 
In its relations with Asian-Pacific 
neighbours, Beijing asserted its core 
interests to prevail in maritime territorial 
disputes, even at the expense of appearing 
the villain. For many decades after the 
founding of the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC), China pursued a delaying 
strategy, which maintained China’s claim 
to the disputed territory but avoided using 
forces to escalate the conflicts because its 
military forces were mostly land-based 
and its naval capacity could rarely reach 
beyond its near seas. Fueled by rapid 
economic growth, China engaged for 
nearly two decades in a swift and wide-
ranging military modernisation with an 
emphasis on building naval capacity. 
With enhanced military capacity, 
the People’s Liberation Army Navy 
(PLAN)’s mission has expanded beyond 
primarily defending China’s coastlines 
to securing the resources and sea lanes 
from the East China Sea along the 
Ryukyu Islands chain, through Taiwan 
and the Philippines, and to the Straits of 
Malacca in the South China Sea. Feeling 
it has more leverage and right to assert 
its core interests forcefully, and catering 
to popular nationalist demands, China 
with unprecedented Chinese objections. 
In addition to what China did in the 
past by announcing the suspension of 
some military exchanges with the U.S. 
and unleashing a storm of bluster by 
various relevant government and military 
agencies, the Chinese Foreign Ministry 
spokesman, officially threatened for the 
first time to impose sanctions against 
American companies involved in the 
arms sales.10 In response to President 
Obama’s meeting with the Dalai Lama 
in early 2010, instead of following the 
low-profile dictum, China reminded the 
West of the tough statement that Deng 
once made: “no one should expect China 
to swallow the bitter fruit that hurts its 
interests”.11
China’s assertiveness vis-à-vis Europe, 
on issues involving its core interests, 
was even more apparent. Regularly 
punishing European countries when 
their leaders met the Dalai Lama in 
an official setting, China denounced 
German chancellor Angela Merkel over 
her meeting with the Tibetan spiritual 
leader. China also suspended ties with 
Denmark after its prime minister met 
the Dalai Lama and resumed them only 
after the Danish government issued 
a statement saying it would oppose 
Tibetan independence and consider 
Beijing’s reaction before inviting him 
again. After French president Nicolas 
Sarkozy met with the Dalai Lama in his 
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to nationalise the disputed Senkaku/
Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea. 
These incidents provoked diplomatic 
crises during which China displayed its 
naval warships to support its sovereignty 
claims. As a result, China’s relations with 
the Asia-Pacific countries have come to a 
low point not seen in many years.
China’s toughness also played out in 
the renewed dispute with India over 
what India claims to be its northeastern 
state of Arunachal Pradesh and China 
claims to be its territory of Southern 
Tibet. During the 1962 Sino-Indian 
Border War, China had advanced deep 
into this region and withdrew after a 
brief occupation. Although Arunachal 
Pradesh achieved statehood in 1987, 
China has continued to lay claim to 
this territory and objected to any Indian 
assertion of sovereignty over the area, 
expressing this in increasingly strident 
language in recent years. In the summer 
of 2009, for instance, China blocked the 
Asian Development Bank from making 
a US $60 million multi-year loan 
because the loan was for infrastructure 
improvements in the state.14 India 
modified its long time-delaying strategy 
and embarked on a new pattern of 
aggressively asserting its suzerainty and 
sovereignty over the disputed maritime 
territories. 
As a result, although China’s official 
statements on core interest issues 
involving sovereignty and territorial 
integrity referred almost exclusively 
to the three issues of Taiwan, Tibet 
and Xinjiang: “where the secessionist 
momentum challenges not only 
China’s territorial integrity, but also the 
legitimacy of the Chinese Communist 
Party as the ruling party of China”,12 
Chinese leaders expanded the core 
interest issues in 2009 to include the 
maritime territorial claims in South 
China Sea, where China confronts a 
mosaic of disputes over islands and seas 
also claimed by Southeast Asian nations.13 
Deploying more personnel and installing 
new equipment to carry out regular sea 
patrols and more frequent and forceful 
law enforcement in the South and East 
China Seas, China made strong reactions 
against a chain of incidents during 2009 
to 2012, including China’s repeated 
attempts to prevent Vietnamese and 
Philippine vessels from exploring oil and 
gas in disputed waters in the South China 
Sea, and China’s punitive actions during 
the Sino-Japanese stand-off over Japan’s 
detention of a Chinese trawler captain 
and the Japanese government’s decision 
It is a combination of confidence, 
frustration, and uncertainty that 
resulted in China’s newfound 
assertiveness.
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third factor is that the possible slowdown 
of China’s economic growth and the 
ongoing leadership transition brought 
uneasiness among Chinese leaders, who 
had to meet any perceived threat to the 
regime’s legitimacy with an unusually 
harsh reaction. It is a combination of 
confidence, frustration, and uncertainty 
that resulted in China’s newfound 
assertiveness.
China’s confidence is derived mostly 
from its enhanced power capacity, 
particularly its relative success in 
shrugging off the global financial 
crisis and maintaining a strong growth 
trajectory. ‘Chinese leaders are in 
essence realists. Their making of Chinese 
foreign policy often starts from a careful 
assessment of China’s relative power 
in the world’.17 As a result of China’s 
perception of the global balance of 
power tilting in its favour, Chinese 
leaders became increasingly confident of 
its ability to deal with the West and settle 
territorial disputes on its own terms, and 
are more willing to shape proactively 
then moved to fund the projects itself, 
prompting China to send more troops 
to the border. A trip by the Dalai Lama 
in November 2009 to the state led Sino-
Indian relations to deteriorate even 
further. Beijing was angered because the 
Dalai Lama did not just visit Itanagar, 
the state capital, but Tawang, which is 
the main bone of contention between 
India and China and was described by 
Indian officials involved in the border 
negotiations with China as ‘the piece of 
Indian real estate that China covets the 
most in the border dispute’.15 In Indian 
eyes China has become increasingly 
provocative over their long-running 
territorial disputes in the Himalayas. 
As tensions intensified, India was awash 
with predictions over China’s impending 
attack by 2012.16
Sources of China’s Changing 
Foreign Policy Behaviour 
There are many factors that help 
explain China’s changing foreign policy 
behaviour. One is China’s increasing 
confidence in its ability to deal with the 
West and the territorial disputes with its 
neighbours. The second factor is China’s 
frustration over the perceived anti-China 
forces trying to prevent China’s rise to its 
rightful place. This frustration sustained 
the nationalist sentiment to assert 
China’s core interests and prevail. The 
In parts of Asia, Africa and 
Latin America, the China 
model or ‘Beijing consensus’ 
became more popular than 
the previously dominant 
‘Washington consensus’.
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Conference) Politburo meeting in early 
October 2008 was devoted to battling 
the global economic tsunami.19 After the 
meeting, the State Council announced 
a four-trillion-yuan (US $586 billion) 
economic stimulus package on 9 
November. Thereafter, state-run banks 
were busy pumping money throughout 
the economy. This huge fiscal stimulus 
package and expansion of state-owned 
bank lending quickly pushed China’s 
economy out of the downturn. For the 
first time in history, Chinese spending, 
rather than the U.S. consumers, became 
the key to a global recovery. As a result, 
many Chinese were convinced that 
a ‘China model’ that could strike a 
balance between economic growth and 
political stability, and between a market-
oriented economy and an authoritarian 
state, worked better for China than 
the Western model of modernisation. 
China’s economic success made the 
China model an alternative to the 
Western model.20 In parts of Asia, Africa 
and Latin America, the China model 
or ‘Beijing consensus’ became more 
popular than the previously dominant 
‘Washington consensus’. As many 
developing countries looked for a recipe 
for faster growth and greater stability 
than that offered by the neoliberal 
prescriptions of open markets and free 
elections, the China model became an 
intellectual symbol of national pride in 
China. 
the external environment rather than 
passively react to it, to safeguard 
forcefully China’s national interests 
rather than compromise them. 
For many years, the Chinese were 
on the receiving end of patronising 
lectures from Western leaders about the 
superiority of their brand of capitalism. 
Now the tables have been turned. At 
the April 2009 Boao Asia Forum, an 
annual high-level gathering of political 
and business leaders from Asia-Pacific 
countries held on China’s Hainan Island, 
a Western journalist reported that “there 
seemed scarcely a moment when a top 
Chinese official wasn’t ridiculing the 
world’s financial institutions, demanding 
major concessions from the United States, 
proposing new Asia-centric international 
architecture, or threatening to turn off 
the taps of Chinese capital which the 
rest of the world so desperately needs”.18 
Indeed, the power transition from 
President George W. Bush to President 
Barack Obama, and political gridlock in 
Congress, delayed adoption of a stimulus 
bill until February 2009, shortly after 
President Obama took office, too late to 
prevent the deep economic contraction. 
In comparison, the Chinese government 
was much more effective in deploying 
its enormous state capacity to ward off 
the economic recession. After Lehman 
Brothers fell in September 2008, a 
two-day CCP (Political Consultative 
Chinese Foreign Policy as a Rising Power to find its Rightful Place
109
containing China. As a Chinese foreign 
policy analyst stated, ‘with China’s rapid 
rise, the nature of the (China-U.S.) 
bilateral ties may evolve from the “sole 
superpower against one of multiple other 
great powers” into “Number One and 
Number Two powers”, and this may lead 
to a rise in tensions and conflicts’.22 
Obama’s presidency during a deep 
financial meltdown provided an 
opportunity to test this thesis. Many 
Chinese assumed that a weakened U.S., 
heavily in debt to China, would have to 
make more concessions to China’s core 
interests. This assumption seemed to be 
confirmed by the first overseas trip in 
late February 2009 of a duly penitent 
U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, 
who once boasted how strongly she 
had emphasised human rights during 
her 1995 visit to Beijing, but who now 
suggested that China’s human rights 
records should not get in the way of 
cooperation on the financial crisis and 
security issues. As a Chinese scholar 
noted, after this visit, many Chinese 
thought that the U.S. ‘should respond 
nicely to China’ because China did 
‘favours for the U.S. on a couple of fronts 
– such as investing in its bonds and 
jointly stimulating the world economy’. 
These Chinese were, therefore, frustrated 
at the end of the year by ‘the rigid 
U.S. position’ that ‘does not reflect the 
nature of the new Sino-U.S. symbiosis 
With increasing confidence in its rising 
power status, China became frustrated 
by what it perceived as anti-China 
forces seeking to prevent China from 
rising to its rightful place. A ‘Middle 
Kingdom’ for centuries, China began a 
steady decline in the late 19th century 
after it suffered defeats and humiliation 
at the hands of foreign imperial powers 
and was plunged into chaos, involving 
war, famine, isolation, and revolution. 
Struggling for national independence 
and modernisation, China was now 
rising to regain the glorious position 
it enjoyed over two centuries ago. This 
great power aspiration, however, was 
met with suspicion and resistance by the 
perceived anti-China forces in the West, 
serving as an uncomfortable reminder of 
the historical humiliation when China 
was weak. Committing to overcoming 
humiliation and restoring its great power 
status, ‘the Chinese have sometimes used 
the term ‘international status’ as if it 
were their only foreign policy goal’21 and 
were therefore frustrated, at the least, by 
the following three perceived barriers 
to China’s achievement of international 
status. 
The first is the so-called structural 
conflict between China as a rising 
power and the United States as the sole 
superpower in the post-Cold War world. 
Beijing was therefore convinced that the 
U.S. would never give up the policy of 
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and other Western countries to block 
China in its global search for resources.
One of the most often cited examples 
is the failure of China National Offshore 
Oil Corporation (CNOOC)’s US $18.5 
billion business takeover bid for the 
California-based oil firm Unocal Corp in 
early 2005, because of unusual political 
intervention from the U.S. Congress, 
which considered that the CNOOC 
takeover of Unocal would make it a 
state-run entity, and constitute a threat 
to U.S. national security. As a result, the 
Chevron Corporation, the second largest 
U.S. petroleum company, acquired 
Unocal for US $17 billion, US $1.5 
billion less than CNOOC’s offer.24 This 
setback, perceived as ignominious by the 
Chinese leadership, was repeated in 2009 
when the Anglo-Australian mining giant 
Rio Tinto walked away from a tentative 
agreement reached in 2008 with China 
Aluminum Corp (Chinalco), which 
had offered to pay US $19.5 billion to 
increase its stake in the global mining 
giant. The deal would have ranked as the 
largest-ever foreign corporate investment 
by a Chinese company. But to Beijing’s 
frustration, Rio Tinto rejected the deal, 
citing fierce shareholder opposition and 
the skepticism of Australian regulators 
because “‘there are lots of Aussies in 
high political places who don’t want 
[...] land and resources sold to China’.25 
The rejection was ‘a blow to China’s 
and fails to recognise Beijing’s growing 
international clout’.23 For these Chinese, 
the troubled relationship with the Obama 
Administration once again confirmed 
that due to the structural conflict thesis, 
the U.S. engagement policy is simply 
another face to cover its hidden agenda 
of preventing China from rising as a peer 
power. Although many Americans cited 
China’s illiberal political system as one of 
the main points of friction and pressed 
China on the issues of human rights and 
democracy, the Chinese have wondered 
whether or not conflict would remain 
and grow starker even if China became 
democratic, as the U.S. would not want 
to see China, democratic or not, to be 
richer and stronger.
Second, many Chinese policymakers 
were frustrated by what they perceived 
as a Western conspiracy to slow down 
China’s rise by blocking China’s 
global search for natural resources and 
acquisition of foreign assets. China’s 
rapid economic growth brought about 
an unprecedented resource vulnerability. 
In 2003 China overtook Japan as the 
second largest oil consumer next to the 
U.S., and in 2004 overtook the United 
States as the world’s biggest consumer 
of grain, meat, coal and steel. China, 
therefore, had to search for resources 
overseas to sustain its rise. Chinese 
policymakers, however, were frustrated 
by the perceived attempts by the U.S. 
Chinese Foreign Policy as a Rising Power to find its Rightful Place
111
spotlighted China’s human rights and 
ethnic problems and led not only to 
wide Western media condemnation but 
also to demonstrations by international 
human rights groups and Tibetan exile 
communities that plagued the Olympic 
torch relay in London, Paris and San 
Francisco. The perception that much 
of the foreign media took a clear anti-
China stance on the issue not only 
frustrated but also angered the Chinese 
government and the Chinese people. 
The Chinese leaders were also 
embarrassed by the announcement by 
the Hollywood director Steven Spielberg 
of his quitting as an artistic consultant to 
the Olympic Games to protest Beijing’s 
Sudan policy. This was followed by 
nine Nobel Peace Prize laureates who 
signed a letter to President Hu, urging 
China to uphold Olympic ideals by 
pressing Sudan to stop atrocities in 
Darfur. The international scrutiny of 
China’s Sudan policy was related to the 
rising expectation of China’s responsible 
behaviour in relations with many of 
its friends in the Global South. Many 
Western countries criticised China for 
undermining their efforts to promote 
transparency and human rights as China 
vied for energy resources in some of 
the most unstable parts of the world. 
They were particularly critical of China 
pursuing deals with countries such as 
Iran and Sudan that were off-limits to 
ambitions to buy access to raw materials 
crucial for its economic growth’.26 
The third frustration was the intensified 
international scrutiny of many of 
China’s awkward domestic and external 
challenges, such as human rights, media 
freedom, Tibet, Taiwan, pollution, and 
relationships with some allies in the 
Global South whom the West considered 
questionable. For example, when China 
was celebrating its success in preparing 
the showcase of the Beijing Olympics 
Games, the Chinese government was 
caught by surprise when in March 
2008 angry Tibetans burned non-
Tibetan businesses and attacked Han 
migrants. Seeing the riot as organised 
by foreign forces featherbedding China 
on human rights, including ethnic 
minority rights in Tibet, to embarrass 
China ahead of the Olympics, Beijing 
dispatched a large number of troops to 
suppress the protests. The suppression 
Beijing was increasingly 
frustrated over whether China 
could match the heightened 
Western expectations, because 
positive responses could invite 
greater demands upon China 
to follow Western expectations 
that China could not or should 
not meet.
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and other Western powers, and calling 
for the Chinese government to redeem 
the past humiliations and take back all 
‘lost territories’, popular nationalists 
increasingly applied heavy pressures 
on the Chinese government to take a 
confrontational position against the 
Western powers and to adopt tougher 
measures to claim its maritime territories 
in the disputes with its Asian neighbours. 
Popular nationalism ran particularly 
high when the global economy sputtered 
in 2008-9, because a battered West 
presented a gratifying target for pent-up 
contempt.
Claiming that the financial crisis could 
result in an envious West doing whatever 
it can to keep China down, whereby a 
showdown was anticipated, a popular 
nationalist book, China is Not Happy, 
tapped into what the authors believed 
to be a widespread public feeling of 
disgruntlement with the West and 
urged China to assert itself militarily, 
diplomatically and in every other way 
to grasp its great power for a place in 
history.28 The book sold half a million 
copies within a few months of its release in 
Western companies because of sanctions, 
security concerns, or the threat of 
bad publicity. To respond to Western 
concerns, China joined the U.S. and 
voted to impose and tighten sanctions 
on Iran, supported the deployment 
of a UN-African Union force in 
Darfur and even sent its own military 
engineers in 2007 to join the force. 
But Beijing was increasingly frustrated 
over whether China could match the 
heightened Western expectations, 
because positive responses could invite 
greater demands upon China to follow 
Western expectations that China could 
not or should not meet. In an angry 
response to the intensified international 
scrutiny, Vice-President Xi Jinping, the 
heir-apparent to President Hu Jintao, 
used extraordinarily strong language 
at a meeting with representatives of 
the Chinese community during a visit 
to Mexico City in February 2009 to 
accuse ‘well-fed foreigners with nothing 
better to do than keep pointing fingers 
at China, even though China is not 
exporting revolution, poverty, hunger, or 
making trouble for other countries. So, 
what else is there to say?’27
This peculiar sense of frustration 
sustained a popular nationalist sentiment, 
which the Chinese government also 
exploited to compensate for the declining 
appeal of communism. With a deeply 
rooted suspicion of the United States 
The boiling Chinese nationalist 
rhetoric was suffused with a 
sense of China as the victim 
yearning for redress. 
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the military elite’.32 The boiling Chinese 
nationalist rhetoric was suffused with a 
sense of China as the victim yearning for 
redress. Seeking status, acceptance, and 
respect on the world stage, and holding 
high expectations for the government to 
fulfill its promise of safeguarding China’s 
national interests, popular nationalists 
often accused the Chinese government 
of being too soft in dealing with Western 
powers.33 
The pressure, therefore, built upon the 
Chinese government to flex its muscles in 
defending its core interests.34 Although 
China’s authoritarian political system 
gives the state immense power to drive 
foreign policy, China is no longer headed 
by charismatic leaders, such as Mao 
Zedong or Deng Xiaoping, who had 
the authority to arbitrate disputes in the 
leadership or personally set the country’s 
course. Current Chinese leaders must 
cater to a range of constituencies, and 
the power of the Chinese government 
has become more and more conditional 
on its ability to defend China’s national 
early 2009, not counting bootleg copies 
and online piracy, and immediately 
shot to the top of the bestseller list.29 
Colonel Dai Xu’s popular book in late 
2009 and his provocative speeches that 
were among the most popular videos on 
China’s Internet claimed that China was 
encircled in a C-shape by hostile or wary 
countries beholden to the United States 
and could not escape the calamity of war 
in the not-too-distant future. Because 
the U.S. put a fire in China’s backyard, 
he called for the Chinese leaders to light 
a fire in the U.S. backyard.30 Senior 
Colonel Liu Mingfu’s 2010 book, The 
China Dream, stood out for its boldness 
in the chorus of popular nationalist 
expressions. Reflecting on China’s 
swelling nationalist ambitions, the book 
called for China to abandon modest 
foreign policy and build the world’s 
strongest military to deter the wary U.S. 
from challenging China’s rise while the 
West was still mired in an economic 
slowdown. If China cannot become the 
world’s ‘number one’, it would inevitably 
become a straggler cast aside in the 21st 
century.31 Because Liu was teaching at 
the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)’s 
National Defence University that 
trains officers, it was believed that ‘the 
appearance of his book underscores calls 
for Beijing to take a hard stance against 
Washington, reaching beyond nationalist 
views on the Internet to include voices in 
Rapid economic growth not 
only created huge social, 
economic and political tensions 
but also raised expectations 
of the Chinese people for the 
government’s performance.
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the global downturn, rapid economic 
growth not only created huge social, 
economic and political tensions but also 
raised expectations of the Chinese people 
for the government’s performance. 
The state faced serious challenges from 
growing public demands related to the 
government’s policies on economic and 
social inequality, endemic corruption, 
epidemic pollution, emaciated 
healthcare, shredded social services, 
entrenched industrial overcapacity, 
swiftly aging population, ethnic conflict, 
etc. ‘The Party leadership is terrified 
of their outsized expectations. People 
under the age of 40, the progeny of the 
one-child policy, did not live through 
Maoist poverty and upheaval. They are 
pampered, impatient and demanding. 
They consider exponential growth a 
basic benchmark of life, and access 
to information to be a civil right’.36 
While few Chinese people at present 
would want Western-style democracy, 
the leaders knew that their legitimacy 
depended on their ability to meet various 
demands from society. 
When the global financial turmoil 
started, the Chinese leaders were not 
sure if it would batter China’s economy 
and produce unrest in society. Their 
concern was not unfounded because, 
in addition to the high-profile riots in 
Tibet in 2008 and in the Muslim region 
of Xinjiang in 2009 that caught them by 
interests as Communist ideology has 
sputtered, and social controls loosened 
by market-oriented economic reform 
and nationalist appeals of prosperity 
and power have become the new bases 
for regime legitimacy. As the strongman 
politics gave way to a collective leadership 
that is more sensitive to popular views 
on issues involving China’s vital national 
interests, political leaders understood 
that mishandling these sensitive issues 
could not only lead to social instability 
but also provide political competitors 
an avenue by which to undermine their 
political standing. This created a vague 
sense of ‘boundary of permissible’,35 
which led to the ‘match’ of who was 
tougher, or at least would not lose any 
ground, on issues that defined the game 
for political gains.
While China’s assertiveness was 
primarily driven by growing confidence 
and frustration, the economic and 
political uncertainties at home also 
played an important part. Although 
China was a relatively bright spot in 
To prove their nationalist 
credentials, Chinese leaders had 
to take an assertive stance in 
defending China’s core interests, 
where national pride and regime 
survival were seen to be at stake.
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power for ambitious and unscrupulous 
leaders during a caustic period. White-
knuckling its way through their final two 
years in office before handing over power 
to the next generation of leaders, the Hu 
Jintao and Wen Jiabao leadership was 
very weak. Nervous about maintaining 
long-term regime legitimacy and social 
stability, the Hu-Wen leadership wanted 
to do their best to foster their reputation 
as protectors of national pride and 
domestic stability, avoid criticism along 
nationalist lines, and boost their support 
among the government officials and 
military officers. To prove their nationalist 
credentials, Chinese leaders had to take 
an assertive stance in defending China’s 
core interests, where national pride and 
regime survival were seen to be at stake. 
The Chinese government, thus, displayed 
an unusually hawkish and nationalistic 
position in pursuing their core interests 
even at the risk of overplaying popular 
nationalism.
Core Interests versus the 
Global Power Responsibility 
While a more powerful China 
has been more willing to leverage 
its growing capabilities to shift the 
global power balance in its favour and 
vigorously pursue its core interests, 
China is not ready to take on the role 
of global leadership and assume more 
surprise, they routinely had to deal with 
tens of thousands of civil and ethnic 
protests from those robbed of their land 
for development, laid-off workers and 
those suffering from the side-effects 
of environmental despoliation. As the 
financial meltdown swept across the 
globe, they did not know what would 
happen to the millions of migrant workers 
who lost their jobs as labor-intensive 
industries churning out cheap products 
for export put up their shutters, and to 
the many white-collar workers who were 
laid off or had their bonuses and wages 
cut. Attributing the financial meltdown 
entirely to ‘economic mismanagement’ 
by the Western countries, the Chinese 
government was able to avoid criticism if 
it also failed but could receive praise if it 
were effective in deploying its enormous 
state capacity to pull its economy out 
of the downturn. Out of anxiety over 
the political consequences of possible 
economic slowdown in the long run, 
the Chinese government’s taking a more 
assertive position to defend China’s core 
interests may not only avoid criticisms 
of its incompetence but also divert 
attention from domestic problems.
The leadership transition in the run-
up to the 2012 Party Congress also 
brought political uncertainty. As the 
succession process geared up, hard-line 
nationalist policies were popular because 
they could become springboards for 
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Former U.S. Deputy Secretary of 
State Robert Zoellick urged China to 
become ‘a responsible stakeholder’ in the 
international system that had enabled its 
success.39 While the Chinese leadership 
generally welcomed the ‘responsible 
stakeholder’ call because, as a China 
Daily commentary suggested, it was an 
indication of the U.S. government seeing 
China as a ‘strategic partner’,40 China is 
still reluctant and very selective in taking 
on global and regional responsibilities, 
instead concentrating mostly on its core 
interests in a fairly narrow sense. One 
Chinese scholar even suggested that the 
Western call for China to take greater 
responsibility was to dictate China’s 
international performance, which was 
another version of the ‘China threat’ 
view.41 In this case, China’s participation 
in international affairs is not simply to 
meet the expectation for its responsibility 
as a rising great power in an increasingly 
interdependent world but most often 
is based on the calculation of its core 
interests. As one American scholar 
criticised, China’s approach towards 
the international regime is guided by 
the ‘maxi-mini-principle- maximisation 
of rights and minimisation of 
responsibilities’.42 Another observer 
believed that ‘China has been a reluctant 
follower, not a leader’.43 Yet another 
observer even suggested that China’s 
policies reflected a ‘me first’ notion.44 
international responsibilities as a 
rising global power. At the first China-
U.S. Strategic & Economic Dialogue 
in Washington D. C. in July 2009, 
State Councilor Dai Binguo told his 
American interlocutors that China’s 
three core interests were to maintain its 
fundamental system and state security, 
state sovereignty and territorial integrity, 
and the continued stable development 
of its economy and society.37 These 
are narrowly defined interests having 
more to do with the Chinese leaders’ 
preoccupation with regime survival and 
national security than with China’s great 
power aspirations. The survival of the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regime 
is the first core interest because, given 
the authoritarian nature of the Chinese 
political system, challenges to its regime 
legitimacy would always be a concern 
for the CCP. A combination of foreign 
forces with domestic discontents could 
seriously threaten the CCP regime.38 The 
second core interest of state sovereignty 
and territorial integration refers almost 
exclusively to the Taiwan and Tibet issues 
and has become increasingly sensitive 
in the context of rising nationalist 
sentiment among the Chinese people. 
Continued economic development and 
social stability becomes the third core 
interest because it is the foundation of 
the CCP’s performance legitimacy to 
justify its continued rule in China.
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On international peace and security, 
China was also often reluctant to step 
up proactively in response to the call 
for Beijing to take more responsibility 
in solving key global issues in troubled 
countries such as North Korea, Iran, 
Afghanistan, Sudan, and Pakistan, 
because China’s interests in these hot 
spots were different from those of the 
Western countries.
As a result, China has not taken on 
a broad international responsibility 
to be the visionary and magnanimous 
global player looking beyond its own 
often desperate and narrowly focused 
core interests. From this perspective, 
one Western observer accused China of 
being a ‘global free rider’ because ‘Beijing 
remains highly reluctant to take on more 
burdens- whether economic, political, or 
military’.48 It was indeed revealing that at 
the G20 summit in April 2009 ‘the only 
thing China cared about was keeping 
Hong Kong off the list of offshore 
tax havens being scrutinised. Beijing’s 
coffers may be bulging with $2.1 trillion 
in foreign-currency reserves, but it is not 
exactly offering to spend that cash on 
common crises. Besides calling for a new 
international reserve currency, China has 
mostly remained silent on how to reform 
the global financial system’.49 Whether a 
free rider or not, juggling its emerging 
great power status with its parochially 
defined core interests, ‘the Chinese 
One Chinese scholar rebutted the 
Western criticism as a distortion of 
China’s international responsibility, 
which, according to him, follows two 
principles. One is to make commitments 
according to its ability [liangli erxing] 
and the other is to combine China’s 
interests with the common interests of 
the international society.45 An official 
Outlook Weekly article, ‘Hu Jintao’s 
Viewpoints about the Times’, proposed 
a concept of ‘shared responsibility’, 
which sets two important parameters 
of Beijing’s international responsibility 
for many sensitive global and regional 
issues. First, China’s contributions to the 
global commonwealth cannot adversely 
affect China’s core interests. Second, 
China’s international commitments are 
conditional upon the inputs of other 
states, especially developed countries and 
regions such as the United States and the 
European Union.46 Based upon this logic, 
China opposed mandatory emission 
reductions for developing countries 
while pressing developed countries for 
deep carbon reduction commitments, as 
well as for financial assistance to poorer 
nations, at the Copenhagen Climate 
Change Summit. By the same token, 
China set conditions for its participation 
in the global efforts to bail out debt-
ridden European countries in 2012. 
One of the conditions was ‘the efforts 
are multilateral, not just bilateral.47 
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world order. The second view calls for 
a modified taoguangyanghui policy to 
give more emphasis on ‘youshuo zuowei’ 
[striking some points/successes] and 
take a more active or even a leadership 
role in pursuing certain foreign policy 
objectives, particularly in China’s core 
interest issue areas. The third view is to 
continue the low-key policy and avoid 
taking a leadership position on most 
issues. The first view has received the 
most attention in the Western media 
and is also popular among the Chinese 
people, but is not the official position 
of the Chinese government, which has 
taken the third view, although in practice 
the second view is the actual policy. 
Clearly, the Chinese leaders, at least 
in public, have not abandoned the 
low-profile policy evident in Premier 
Wen Jiabao’s statement that ‘Precisely 
by not raising our banner or taking the 
lead internationally we have been able 
to expand our room for maneuver in 
international affairs’. Therefore, ‘there 
is no reason whatsoever to alter this 
policy’.52 During a visit to Europe in 
early 2009, when some sensitive Western 
reporters pricked up their ears at Wen’s 
statement that China would be a peaceful 
and cooperative great power and asked 
for a clarification of the phrase ‘great 
power’, the government news agency, 
Xinhua, released an English translation 
of the word as ‘country’ instead. At the 
appeared torn between seizing their 
moment in the geopolitical spotlight and 
shying away from it’.50 On the one hand, 
cherishing China’s rising power status, 
Chinese Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Wu Dawei said that ‘the Hu leadership 
has engaged more actively in world affairs 
in response to growing international 
calls for it to take up greater global 
responsibility and has taken more part in 
affairs that affected global development 
and stability’.51 Meanwhile, focusing 
mostly on its immediate interests and 
emphasising ‘shared responsibility’, the 
Chinese government has tried to avoid 
heightened international expectations.
As a reflection of its torn position, 
Chinese scholars and policymakers have 
been debating and expressing at least three 
views on China’s changing international 
role. One view urged the government 
to abandon the passive ‘tiaoguang 
yanghui’ policy and take a ‘great power’ 
[daguo] responsibility to ensure a ‘just’ 
Delighting in the notion that 
China was recognised as a global 
power, many Chinese were 
initially flattered by the G2 idea, 
which saw the world as a bipolar 
affair, in which America and 
China were the only two powers 
that mattered.
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developing country and struggles to avoid 
controversial global affairs across a range 
of issues and instead focuses on China’s 
immediate interests. One example is 
that, delighting in the notion that China 
was recognised as a global power, many 
Chinese were initially flattered by the G2 
idea, which saw the world as a bipolar 
affair, in which America and China 
were the only two powers that mattered. 
They, however, quickly criticised this 
notion as ‘a potential trap for China that 
could expose it on the world stage’.56 
Wrapping its great power aspirations in 
modesty and pointing out that China 
is still a developing country with only 
one-tenth of the per capita GDP of 
the U.S., Premier Wen Jiabao firmly 
rejected the G2 idea as ‘not appropriate’, 
‘baseless and wrong’ and reiterated that 
‘China remains a developing country, 
despite remarkable achievements, and 
its modernisation will take a long time 
and the efforts of several generations’.57 
Wen’s statement was not simply an 
expression of modesty to soothe Western 
worries over the China threat. As Minxin 
Pei suggested, ‘it is far more likely that 
China’s leaders are actually telling the 
truth’.58 Although China pulled off 
the world’s most impressive recovery 
earlier than many Western countries, 
it still faces numerous internal social, 
economic, environmental, demographic 
and political challenges that could 
same time, after the remarks caused a 
sensation in the international media, 
the Chinese government censors deleted 
from Chinese news reports and official 
websites the unguarded remarks of 
Chinese Vice-President Xi Jinping in 
Mexico that foreign powers had eaten 
their fill and had nothing better to do, 
messing around and pointing their 
fingers at China’s affairs. The domestic 
media were banned from reporting 
his comments.53 As an expression of 
this delicate position, Chinese foreign 
minister Yang Jiechi had to emphasise 
the importance of holding onto the low-
profile policy while calling to ‘act as a 
responsible big country (power)’.54 Two 
Chinese scholars also elaborated this 
position: ‘following Deng’s low-profile 
policy, China has been modest and 
realistic in assessing China’s strengths 
and weaknesses and kept a sober mind, 
and even rejected occasional temptations 
to overestimate its power and influence 
in the world. But this does not mean 
that the Chinese should shake off their 
international obligations’.55
This ambivalent behaviour is a 
reflection of a confusing dual-identity of 
China as a rising power and a developing 
country. While the Chinese view their 
country as inherently a great power 
by virtue of its history, culture and 
population, and cherish its rising power 
status, Beijing still pretends to be a 
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Europeans pass through this difficult 
phase, completing a new round of 
systemic reforms, they will witness a new 
round of technological revolution and an 
explosion of productivity growth, which 
will be the real strike against, and bring 
an end to, China’s period of strategic 
opportunity’. It is from this perspective 
that the scholar commented that ‘the 
game in Sino-U.S. relations is only in 
the opening phase, with the real strategic 
contest yet to come’. China’s greatest 
challenges are ‘not the international 
scene or in our neighbouring region, but 
instead lie in our internal system reform 
and social situation; the real danger is 
not one of military confrontation or 
conflict, but instead stems from troubles 
in the non-military realms of  finance, 
society, the Internet and foreign affairs’. 
He therefore suggested that ‘how to 
cool off the tensions within our region, 
so as to turn to the real work of quickly 
perfecting our own domestic system 
structure and revitalising economic 
society, so as to make our national 
competitiveness as strong as possible, is 
the real challenge China faces today’.60
In this case, the world is not bipolar 
because the U.S., as the world’s biggest 
economy and military power, has the 
capacity to shape the environment in 
which China makes its policy choices 
by strengthening cooperation with its 
allies in Asia as well as in other parts of 
significantly overshadow China’s long-
term economic growth. China also faces 
severe geopolitical challenges. Even in 
its neighbouring Asia-pacific region, 
the reach of China’s power is kept in 
check by the presence and influence of 
the United States and the strength of 
dynamic and vigilant regional powers, 
such as India, Japan, Vietnam, and 
Russia. As a result, ‘China will be unable 
to become hegemon in Asia – a power 
with complete dominance over its 
regional rivals. By definition, a country 
cannot become a global superpower 
unless it is also a regional hegemon, such 
as the United States […] China must 
constantly watch its back while trying 
to project power and influence on the 
global stage’.59 
As one Chinese scholar soberly 
observed, in the wake of the global 
financial meltdown, ‘all  great countries 
at present are trying to do the same 
thing: internally deepen their system 
reform and externally seek strategic 
space’. ‘Once the Americans and 
Political survival at home 
always is the top priority and 
in this regard foreign policies 
are usually more expendable for 
political leaders, Chinese and 
Americans alike.
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ambassador to Russia, Li Fenglin, 
held a web chat  on 20 March 2010 
with Chinese netizens in their official 
capacity as advisory members of the 
Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
They reminded their online audience 
that China was still a few generations 
away from being a true great power and 
cautioned them to have a realistic attitude 
toward the view that ‘China will replace 
the U.S. to become the dominant power 
in the world’. Therefore, China’s taoguang 
yanghui strategy would continue for a 
long time.63 It is worth noting that, while 
the Chinese suspended part of its military 
exchange with the U.S. following the 
arms sale to Taiwan, it allowed the USS 
Nimitz aircraft carrier battle group to 
visit Hong Kong on 7 February, one day 
before President Obama’s meeting with 
the Dalai Lama.64 In spite of angry words 
and a threat to sanction U.S. companies 
involved in the arms sales, China so 
far has not taken action on that threat. 
President Hu participated in the Nuclear 
Security Summit in April 2010, although, 
according to a Chinese scholar, ‘quite a 
significant number of Chinese officials 
objected to Hu’s attendance’ because 
they thought that ‘Hu’s appearance was 
a one-sided concession to the ruthless 
undermining of Chinese national 
dignity’. This scholar revealed that ‘given 
the bitter debate within China on how 
to react in the wake of the U.S. violation 
the world, working with other countries 
in the UN Security Council, and 
broadening engagement across the board 
to bring China along. While the Chinese 
leaders have faced nationalist pressures 
at home to defend its core interests, 
the U.S. politicians have faced similar 
domestic pressures to roll back China’s 
assertiveness. After all, political survival 
at home always is the top priority and 
in this regard foreign policies are usually 
more expendable for political leaders, 
Chinese and Americans alike. China’s 
assertiveness during the global slowdown 
made ‘demonising China’ popular in 
the U.S. media and clearly hardened 
the U.S. positions on some issues China 
defined as its core interests, and to an 
extent increased at least some hostility in 
the U.S. Congress towards China. Thus, 
when China reacted very strongly to the 
U.S. arms sale to Taiwan in early 2010, 
Joseph Nye warned that ‘China has 
miscalculated by violating the wisdom of 
Deng Xiaoping, who advised that China 
should proceed cautiously and keep its 
light under a basket’.61 
Coming to the realisation that ‘they 
had let their rhetoric get ahead of 
their interests, and were looking for a 
way to climb down’,62 at the height of 
China’s confrontation with the U.S. 
over its core interests, two experienced 
Chinese diplomats, former ambassador 
to Germany, Lu Qiutian, and  former 
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pressures and heeds what the West would 
think of its behaviour [bumai xigang de 
zhang] in the pursuit of its interests’.68  
Second, reflecting on China’s growing 
confidence in its increasing power and 
influence, its frustration as a rising 
power on the world stage, and the 
regime’s fear of many social, economic 
and political uncertainties at home, 
China’s new assertiveness has, however, 
focused on pursuing its immediate 
interests, and Beijing is still hesitant to 
use its rising power status to bolster the 
global common welfare. It is, therefore, 
too soon ‘to expect China to play a 
broader role, taking on responsibilities 
for global order and making concessions 
for broader interests’.69 It is from this 
perspective, one observer suggested, that 
‘China has not been psychologically 
prepared to play a full “great power” 
leadership role in confronting problems 
such as climate change, genocide, civil 
war, nuclear proliferation, much less 
of core interests and the divisions 
among Chinese elites’, Hu’s decision to 
go to Washington represented ‘a new 
consensus and a punctuation to domestic 
debates in China. By persistently 
broadening converging interests with 
the U.S. and strengthening cooperation 
on transnational issues, Beijing’s 
pragmatism prevails once again’.65
Conclusion
Three conclusions may be drawn from 
this study. First, keeping its head low 
for many years, China raised its head 
during the global economic downturn in 
2008-2009 when the Western countries’ 
obvious weakness propelled the Chinese 
to rethink relations with Western 
powers.66 This shows that China’s 
growing national strength could alter 
and, to an extent, has already altered 
its foreign policy behaviour. A Chinese 
scholar noted a fundamental foreign 
policy transformation in the mid-2000s, 
characterised by ‘the change of China 
from an ordinary state diplomacy to great 
power diplomacy, from weak-posture 
diplomacy to strong-posture diplomacy, 
and from a passive diplomacy to a 
proactive diplomacy’.67 Another Chinese 
scholar observes that ‘in comparison to 
the past years, Chinese foreign policy in 
2009 witnessed an important change’ 
as ‘China no longer bends to Western 
One defining tension in China’s 
foreign policy agenda is still to 
find a balance between taking 
broad responsibility as a great 
power and focusing on its 
narrowly defined core interests 
to play down its pretence of 
being a global power.
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eliminate this contradiction when the 
Chinese leaders come to ‘view their 
country less as a poor nation and more 
as a great power’.71 Until then, Chinese 
foreign policy is still in a transitional 
stage from a reluctant rising power to 
a true great power. Chinese foreign 
policy behaviour during this transitional 
period can still be explained by defensive 
realism, which sees a hierarchical 
power structure that ‘is constantly in 
flux, reflecting variations in relative 
power’,72 Emphasising the importance of 
balancing behaviour, however, defensive 
realism stresses the degree to which 
unrestrained pursuit of power can lead 
to counterbalancing. Therefore, it tends 
to ‘avoid unnecessary provocation’.73 But 
whether this defensive realism will lead 
to an offensive realism or a responsible 
stakeholder in the international system, 
is still anyone’s guess.
abusive governments. Its rigid notion 
of sovereign rights has made leaders 
reluctant to criticise publicly or intrude 
overtly in the internal affairs of other 
countries. This reluctance has only been 
reinforced by China’s view of itself as 
a victim of hegemonic predation by 
stronger colonialist and imperialist 
powers over the past one and a half 
centuries’.70 
Third, one defining tension in 
China’s foreign policy agenda is still to 
find a balance between taking broad 
responsibility as a great power and 
focusing on its narrowly defined core 
interests to play down its pretence of 
being a global power. Rising as a great 
power but still trailing far behind the U.S., 
China is not yet in a position to dislodge 
America from its position of global 
dominance. The continuing growth of 
China’s national strength may eventually 
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